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[1] 
One Duty to All: 
The Fiduciary Duty of Impartiality and 
Stockholders’ Conflict of Interest 
 
Shachar Nir 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The typical structure of corporations with multiple classes of stock 
consist of multiple classes of preferred stock and one or more types of 
common stock. These structures are most commonly used in venture capital-
backed companies.1 Venture capitalists and other “outside” investors2 
receive preferred stock whereas founders and company employees, by and 
large, hold common stock. 
In general, common stock entitles its holder the right to vote in 
shareholders’ meeting (i.e., voting rights) and the right to receive 
distributions of a company’s surplus upon a distribution event, which can be 
either a mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) event or a dividend distribution 
(i.e., economic rights).3 Preferred stock typically entitles its holder to receive 
all the rights of the common stock along with additional rights, contractual 
in nature. Such rights can be either additional voting rights (e.g., veto rights 
over corporate decisions)4 or additional economic rights (e.g., the right to 
receive, upon a distribution event, the investment amount prior to any 
                                                          
 Master of Laws (LLM) ‘19, Stanford Program in Corporate Governance & Practice (CGP), Stanford 
Law School. I am deeply grateful to my advisor, Professor Joseph Grundfest, for his invaluable guidance 
and full support. I am also grateful to Professor of the Practice of Law, Michael Challahan, for his 
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throughout this process have been invaluable. Special thanks to Professor Michael Klausner, Andrew 
Winden and Spencer Williams for their guidance and thoughtful feedback on earlier drafts of this Article. 
Thanks also to the editors of Hastings Business Law Journal, especially Kya Coletta, for outstanding 
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 1. See Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 1 U. PA. L. REV. 14-18 (forthcoming 2018), https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3352203. 
 2. Such as angel investors. See id. Angel investors are wealthy individuals who personally finance 
the same high-risk, high-growth start-ups as venture capitalists, at an earlier stage. See infra note 159 and 
accompanying text. 
 3. See Model Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation, NVCA (Jan. 2018), 
https://nvca.org/resources/model-legal-documents/. 
 4. See id. 
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distributions to the common stockholders). The latter right is known as 
liquidation preference and it is one of the most significant features of 
preferred stock.5 
These additional rights are contractual in nature, and, as with any other 
contract, the parties negotiate the terms of such rights. The common 
stockholders, typically founders and company’s employees, secure the 
required financing and receive extensive resources to professional services, 
such as project advisement. Research demonstrates that projects financed 
through venture capitalists have higher returns, higher growth, higher risk, 
and will be larger in size.6 Moreover, research also shows that a legal 
environment supported by venture capitalists is one that strongly protects 
intellectual property rights,7 which is generally considered the most 
significant asset in a start-up.8 
The contributions made by the venture capitalists (the preferred 
stockholders) are not done for free.9 A venture capitalist will only invest if 
the deal is logical, which typically means that he will receive an adequate 
sort of consideration, such as additional voting or economic rights. These 
additional rights seek to protect the high-risk investment of the preferred 
stockholders (normally venture capitalists) in start-ups;10 in its early stages, 
a start-up success is highly uncertain—it can either become wildly successful 
or fail entirely.11 
The cases discussed below suggest that enforcement of the preferred 
additional rights should be carried out in a different manner from 
enforcement of the common rights. This “different treatment” has the 
potential not only to diminish the utility of the preferred,12 but also to disable 
                                                          
 5. A liquidation preference provision entitles a venture capitalist to receive a fixed amount (usually 
the amount of the original investment, or a multiple thereof) for each share of preferred stock; in certain 
events, this fixed amount is received before payments are made to other stockholders. See Gordon D. 
Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 347 (2005). 
 6. See Masako Ueda, Banks Versus Venture Capital: Project Evaluation, Screening, and 
Expropriation, 59 J. FIN. 601, 601-02 (2004). 
 7. See id. 
 8. See, e.g., Using IP for Development: Success Stories from Around the World, WORLD 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (“WIPO”) (2017), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/ 
wipo_pub_using_ip_dev.pdf. WIPO’s white paper suggests that intellectual property is the basis for a 
significant portion of venture capital investments; see also David Hsu & Rosemarie Ziedonis, Patents as 
Quality Signals for Entrepreneurial Ventures, 1 ACAD. OF MGMT. PROCEEDINGS (2008). 
 9. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
1815, 1874 (2013). 
 10. See id.  
 11. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Poor Pitiful or Potently Powerful Preferred?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2025, 
2037 (2013); see also Pollman, supra note 1, at 16. 
 12. See discussion infra page 10, Part I.B. 
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that productive mode of financing,13 which would not otherwise be received 
by alternate sources (such as banks).14 Thus, one who considers whether 
these additional (preferred) rights should be enforced in the same manner as 
common rights should ask this: “whether the [common] shareholders would 
have been better or worse off without the preferred financing.”15 
The first major case to suggest this ‘different treatment’ was decided in 
2013. That year, the venture capital community was rocked by a decision of 
the Delaware Chancery Court in In re Trados Shareholder Litigation.16 In 
Trados, the corporation faced financial difficulties when a potential buyer 
emerged and the board saw to sell the corporation at a deal price almost equal 
to the preferred liquidation preference. In other words, the preferred 
stockholders received almost all of their liquidation preference, and the 
common stockholders received nothing. Before finding that the common 
stock was actually worth nothing, the court held that when a board of 
directors considers whether to take corporate action, it should consider solely 
the interests of its common stockholders as “residual claimants,” and the 
interests of preferred stockholders should be taken into account only to the 
extent that they do not invoke their special contractual rights and rely on a 
right shared equally with the common stockholders.17 
In 2017, the Delaware Chancery Court again ruled in Fredrick Hsu 
Living Trust v. ODN Holding Corp. et al.18 In ODN, the court refused to 
dismiss claims against the board of ODN, stating that it breached its fiduciary 
duties to common stockholders by selling certain corporation business lines 
and assets to fund a mandatory redemption of preferred stock that had vested 
after five years. Although the mandatory redemption was a contractual 
obligation to the preferred stockholders, the court held that such a contractual 
right is subject to the board’s fiduciary duty; the board has the right/duty to 
decide whether it is in the best interests of the common stockholders (i.e., 
not the enterprise as a whole) to commit an “efficient breach” of the 
corporation’s obligation to the preferred stockholders.19 
                                                          
 13. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1874. 
 14. See Pollman, supra note 1, at 15. 
 15. See Simone M. Sepe, Intruders in the Boardroom: The Case of Constituency Directors, 91 
WASH. U. L. REV. 309, 357-58 (2013). 
 16. 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013) [hereinafter Trados or Trados II, as applicable]. I would like to note 
that there are subsequent decisions by the Delaware Chancery Court affirming Trados. See In re Nine 
Sys. Corp. Shareholders Litigation, 2014 WL 4383127 (Del. Ch. Sept. 4, 2014), aff’d sub nom Fuchs v. 
Wren Holdings, LLC, 129 A.3d 882 (Del. 2015); In re PLX Technology Inc. Stockholders Litigation, 
2018 WL 5018535 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2018); Mehta v. Mobile Posse, Inc., 2019 WL 2025231 (Del. Ch. 
May 8, 2019). 
 17. See In re Trados Shareholder Litigation, 73 A.3d 17, 36-37 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 18. 2017 WL 1437308 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2017) [hereinafter ODN]. 
 19. See ODN Holding Corp., 2017 WL 1437308, at *53-54. 
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Fiduciary duties serve as one of the most important and fundamental 
corporate governance mechanisms in monitoring the behavior of directors20 
and, in so doing, reducing agency costs.21 The court’s decisions in the Trados 
and ODN cases established that fiduciary duties are owed to the holders of 
“permanent capital” as residual claimants, and, in most cases, this will be the 
holders of the common stock, with fiduciary duties owed to the holders of 
preferred stock only to the extent their interests overlap with the interests of 
the common stockholders.22 After those decisions were rendered, many 
corporate law scholars came forward to praise and support the Delaware 
Chancery Court’s unequivocal stand.23 
This Article, however, takes a more skeptical view and raises the 
following questions: 
Should preferred stockholders (in all cases) be considered residual 
claimants? Should conflicts between common and preferred stockholders 
always be resolved in a way that maximizes value for the common 
stockholders, or should conflict be resolved in a way that would maximize 
the value of the enterprise as a whole? Should the court use different legal 
rules for different types of conflicts? How should interclass preference 
conflicts be resolved in both privately held and publicly traded corporations? 
To answer the above questions, this Article analyzes stockholders’ 
conflicts of interest on two levels: 
First, Part I of this Article analyzes the common-preferred conflict in 
light of the Trados and ODN cases. The analysis argues that due to: 
 
                                                          
 20. See Arthur R. Pinto, Corporate Governance: Monitoring the Board of Directors in American 
Corporations, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 317, 330 (1998); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. 
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991). 
 21. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM L. REV. 
1416 (1989). 
 22. See Trados, 73 A.3d at 40-42. 
 23. See, e.g., Juliet P. Kostritsky, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Contextual Approach to Fiduciary 
Duties Owed to Preferred Stockholders from Venture Capital to Public Preferred to Family Business, 70 
RUTGERS. U. L. REV. 43 (2017) (discussing whether corporations should owe fiduciary duties to its 
preferred stockholders and suggesting a limited fiduciary obligation to preferred stockholders in two 
specific contexts. The first is when non-working children are given preferred stock in a family business. 
The second is when a corporation takes on a new unfamiliar product line, allowing common stockholders 
to wipe out the value of publicly traded preferred stock); Abraham J.B. Cable, Opportunity-Cost Conflicts 
in Corporate Law, 66 CASE WESTERN RESERVE L. REV. 51 (2015) (discussing the opportunity-cost 
conflict raised in Trados and arguing that courts should invoke the doctrine sparingly to avoid upsetting 
the law’s current balance between policing managerial abuse and litigation abuse); Charles R. Korsmo, 
Venture Capital and Preferred Stock, 78 BROOK L. REV. 1163 (2013) (suggesting that VC holders of 
preferred stock should never be afforded fiduciary protections and should always be required to rely on 
the protections of their contract); Strine, supra note 11, at 2039 (discussing Trados in response to a 
critique by Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9). 
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1. the equity features of non-redeemable preferred stock;24 
2. the questionable enforcement of preferred stockholders’ rights 
on the contractual level;25 and 
3. the implications of the court’s view in Trados and ODN with 
respect to an increase in agency costs,26 transaction costs,27 and 
value-maximization issues,28 enforcement of preferred 
stockholders’ rights should be undertaken via the board of 
directors’ fiduciary duties to all stockholders, without 
prejudice. 
Second, Part II of this Article analyzes potential interclass preference 
conflicts between and among different types of preferred and common 
stockholders, in both privately held and publicly traded corporations. This 
Article argues that the current approach the Delaware Chancery Court takes 
lacks a solution with respect to interclass preference conflicts both for 
privately held and publicly traded corporations.29 
Third, Part III of this Article concludes with a proposed framework for 
resolving stockholders’ conflicts of interest that were previously discussed. 
This Article proposes the fiduciary duty of impartiality—an extension of the 
duty of loyalty—as an analytical framework to resolve conflicts of interest 
between and among holders of common stock and multiple classes of 
preferred stock. 
 
I. FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND COMMON-
PREFERRED CONFLICT OF INTERESTS 
 
In general, a corporate board of directors has fiduciary duties that 
require it to make business decisions that are in the best interests of its 
stockholders.30 This aspect of fiduciary duty is known as the “shareholder 
primacy norm,”31 or “shareholder wealth maximization norm,” under which 
directors have a duty to maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit 
of its stockholders.32 
 
                                                          
 24. See infra page 14, Part I.B.i.1. 
 25. See id.; see also infra page 18, Part I.B.i.2. 
 26. See infra page 21, Part I.B.2.ii. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See infra page 22, Part I.B.iii. 
 29. See infra page 24, Part II. 
 30. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
 31. See Gordon, D. Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998). 
 32. See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684; see also eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 
(Del. Ch. 2010). 
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A. TRADOS AND ODN CASES 
 
In Trados and ODN, the Delaware Chancery Court faced the dilemma of 
settling a common-preferred conflict of interest with respect to the allocation 
of the merger consideration.33 Citing earlier Delaware case law on the 
matter,34 the court embraced the view that where directors can exercise 
discretion, they should generally prefer the interests of common stockholders 
to those of preferred stockholders.35 In other words, fiduciary duties are owed 
to the holders of “permanent capital” as residual claimants and, in most 
cases, such holders will be the holders of common stock, with fiduciary 
duties owed to holders of preferred stock only to the extent that their interests 
overlap.36 
The basic stance of the court’s decisions is that holders of preferred 
stock obtain their rights and protections by contract (i.e., by the terms of the 
preferred). However, in reaching its decisions, the court failed to make an 
important distinction among different rights tied to stock ownership37 and to 
address enforcement of the preferred stockholders’ rights at the contractual 
level.38 
The Delaware Chancery Court’s decisions also failed to address a broad 
range of complex, but commonly occurring, potential conflicts between and 
among holders of common stock and multiple classes of preferred stock.39 
Finally, the court’s decisions also have a negative impact on agency costs,40 
transaction costs,41 and value-maximization issues.42 
 
i. Trados Case (2013) 
 
In Trados, the board of directors’ decision to sell the corporation was 
challenged by a stockholder who owned 5% of the corporation’s common 
stock.43 At and before the time of sale, the corporation faced financial 
difficulties and its mixed performance during the three years preceding the 
                                                          
33.  See In re Trados Shareholder Litigation, 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 34. See id. at 37-41; Fredrick Hsu Living Trust v. ODN Holding Corp. et al., 2017 WL 1437308, at 
*50-51 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2017). 
35.  See Trados, 73 A.3d at 37-41; ODN Holding Corp., 2017 WL 1437308, at *50-51. 
 36. See Trados, 73 A.3d at 37-41; ODN Holding Corp., 2017 WL 1437308, at *50-51. 
 37. See discussion infra page 14, Part I.B.i.1. 
 38. See id.; see also infra page 18, Part I.B.i.2. 
 39. See infra page 24, Part II. 
 40. See infra page 21, Part I.B.2.ii. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See infra page 22, Part I.B.iii. 
43.  See In re Trados Shareholder Litigation, 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
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merger led its board of directors to search for exit opportunities.44 The board 
of directors considered two major exit opportunities with three different 
buyers, ultimately accepting the one that would likely to result in higher 
value and lower risk at that time.45 
The merger consideration satisfied nearly all the preferred liquidation 
preference and left no proceeds for the common stock. Although the court 
found that the common stock was worth nothing, it emphasized that a board 
of directors does not owe fiduciary duties to preferred stockholders when 
considering whether to take corporate action that might trigger or circumvent 
the preferred stockholders’ contractual rights.46 In other words, pursuant to 
the court’s view, rights that are enjoyed solely by the preferred class do not 
give rise to fiduciary duties, because such rights are purely contractual in 
nature.47 
The court’s rationale was that preferred stockholders protect their rights 
via their contractual arrangements (e.g., liquidation preference, veto rights, 
drag-along provisions), and the fiduciary obligation should generally be 
saved for holders of common stock.48 However, as we shall see in the 
following Part,49 preferred rights, whether entitled as contractual or equity 
rights, are, as a practical matter, enforced via corporate actions, and are 
subject to fiduciary duties obligations. For that reason, the dichotomic 
separation between contract and equity rights, with respect to holders of 
preferred stock, creates a situation where the rights of the preferred cannot 
in fact be enforced in many situations. 
In its Trados II holding, the Delaware Chancery Court cited numerous 
Delaware cases to support its decision.50 Among others, the following 
citations illustrate the court’s dramatic shift toward a dichotomic approach 
in resolving common-preferred conflicts: 
In Wolfensohn v. Madison Fund, Inc.,51 the preferred stockholders 
received both debentures and a share of common stock. The court held that 
such preferred stockholders were not owed fiduciary duties in their capacity 
as debenture holders and only had their contractual rights as creditors.52 
Similarly, in Simons v. Cogan,53 the court held that a “convertible debenture 
                                                          
 44. See id. at 8-10, 18-20. 
 45. See id. at 23-24. 
 46. See id. at 36-37. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. at 40-41. 
 49. See infra page 10, Part I.B. 
 50. See Trados, 73 A.3d at 36-41. 
 51. 253 A.2d 72 (Del. 1969). 
 52. See id. at 75. 
 53. 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988). 
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represents a contractual entitlement to the repayment of a debt and does not 
represent an equitable interest in the issuing corporation necessary for the 
imposition of a trust relationship with concomitant fiduciary duties.”54 
These cases are significantly different from the situation in Trados. In 
Trados, the preferred stockholders were not considered creditors because 
their preferred stock was considered an equity instrument rather than a debt 
instrument.55 Therefore, their contractual rights were different from those of 
creditors, as preferred rights are generally enforced via corporate action 
directly affecting all stockholders, and, thus, created a direct conflict 
between common and preferred stockholders. 
By not distinguishing between holders of equity instruments (e.g., 
preferred stockholders) and holders of debt instruments (e.g., creditors) with 
respect to the fiduciary duty obligation,56 the court opened the door to 
possible situations in which preferred stockholders could be left without 
adequate protection of their rights. This conclusion is reinforced in cases of 
redeemable preferred stock, such as in ODN57 and cases in which the board 
of directors is controlled by common stockholders; it would be difficult, if 
not impossible, to impugn the board’s entitlement to the business judgment 
rule58 (i.e., a rebuttable presumption that a court will not second-guess a 
board of directors’ decision).59 This presumption may be rebutted in cases of 
fraud, illegality, or conflict of interest transactions.60 
Another case cited by the Trados II court is LC Capital Master Fund, 
Ltd. v. James.61 In that case, the preferred stockholders claimed that the board 
of directors’ decision to allocate the merger consideration on an as-converted 
basis, rather than in accordance with the liquidation preference (specified in 
                                                          
 54. See id. at 303. 
 55. See Trados, 73 A.3d at 38. 
 56. See id. at 41. (“This principle is not unique to preferred stock; it applies equally to other holders 
of contract rights against the corporation.”). 
 57. See infra page 10, Part I.A.ii; see also discussion infra page 18, Part I.B.i.2 
 58. See LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, 990 A.2d 435, 453 (Del. Ch. 2010). For arguments 
supporting the proposition that a board elected by common stock owners owes fiduciary duties to the 
common stockholders, but not the preferred stockholders, compare Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency 
Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 990-93 (2006) (interpreting 
Orban v. Field, 1997 WL 153831 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997) as supporting a “control-contingent approach,” 
in which a board elected by the common stock owes fiduciary duties to the common stockholders, but not 
the preferred stockholders; however, a board elected by the preferred stockholders can promote the 
interests of the preferred stock at the expense of the common stock) with Trados, 73 A.3d at 43 (“The 
control-contingent interpretation does not comport with how I understand the role of fiduciary duties or 
the ruling in Orban, which I read as a case in which the common stock had no economic value such that 
a transaction in which the common stockholders received nothing was fair to them.”). 
 59. See Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 608 (Del. Ch. 1974). 
 60. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 NE 2d 776 (Ill. App. 1968). 
 61. 990 A.2d 435 (Del. Ch. 2010) [hereinafter LC Capital]. 
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the certificate of incorporation)62 was not a breach of their fiduciary duties. 
Citing Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams,63 In re Trados Shareholder 
Litigation,64 Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc.,65 and In re FLS Holdings, 
Inc. Shareholder Litigation,66 the LC Capital court noted that once 
preferred contractual rights are articulated in corporate documents, the 
board must first respect such rights and then, to the extent there is no 
contractual basis as to a specific corporate resolution, must act as a “gap-
filling agency and do its best to fairly reconcile the competing interests of 
the common and preferred.”67 
In taking a corporate action pursuant to LC Capital,68 a board should 
consider both preferred and common stockholders’ rights.69 The Trados II 
court, however, established a more extreme approach: a board of directors 
should only seek to maximize the value of a corporation for the benefit of 
the common stockholders.70 Thus, the Trados II decision significantly tipped 
the balance in favor of common stockholders’ interests per se and has led to 
a series of problems whenever there is a gap-filling situation.71 
A recent, and more extreme, application of the Trados decision can be 
found in the opinion from Vice Chancellor Katie McCormick in Mehta v. 
Mobile Posse, Inc.72 Similar to Trados, in Mobile Posse, a preferred-
controlled board of directors approved the sale of a corporation at a price that 
would leave the common stockholders with nothing.73 
During the three years preceding the merger, the corporation worked 
with two investment bankers who contacted more than 100 potential buyers 
and entered into two negotiation processes that ultimately failed due to 
                                                          
 62. Note that in LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, the liquidation preference specified in the 
certificate of incorporation was not, by its terms, triggered by the merger. 
 63. 705 A.2d 1040, 1042 (Del. Ch. 1997). 
 64. In re Trados Shareholder Litigation, 2009 WL 2225958, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009) 
[hereinafter Trados I]. 
65.  Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584 (Del. Ch. 1986).  
66.  In re FLS Holdings, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 1993 WL 104562, at *5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 2, 1993).  
 67. See LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, 990 A.2d 435, 438-39, 449 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 68. This will further be addressed in the discussion regarding the ODN case, as it is not clear whether 
the board of directors would honor the contractual rights of the preferred stock class in all cases. 
 69. See supra note 62; see also LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd., 990 A.2d at 446. 
 70. See In re Trados Shareholder Litigation, 73 A.3d 17, 40-43 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 71. See infra page 10, Part I.B. 
 72. 2019 WL 2025231 (Del. Ch. May 8, 2019) [hereinafter Mobile Posse]. 
 73. The ultimate deal price was $33,800,000 in cash and $1,000,000 in rollover equity, which was 
lower than the total obligation to the preferred (i.e., $44,678,801 in liquidation preference and 
$17,003,591 in accrued, but unpaid dividends). The ultimate deal negotiated involved senior preferred 
stockholders forgoing a portion of their liquidation preference to enable lower classes of preferred stock 
(but not common stockholders) to receive some consideration. See id. at *5-7. 
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concerns that the corporation depended on just a single customer.74 Despite 
that fact, the court held that although the defendants had argued that the 
common stock was worth nothing75 (as was the case in Trados), the merger 
was not altogether fair due to an unfair sale process.76 
Assuming the sale process was flawed, the fact that two previous 
potential buyers walked away from the deal due to exactly the same 
business risk (i.e., the corporation depended on a single customer) makes 
it difficult to see how even an unflawed sale process could have resulted in 
a deal price that would have been high enough for common stockholders 
to have received payment.77 
 
ii. ODN Case (2017) 
 
 Continuing with the line of Trados and prior case law on mandatory 
redemption,78 the ODN court held that the board of directors breached its 
fiduciary duties to the common stockholders by selling certain business lines 
and assets to fund a mandatory redemption of preferred stock that vested 
after five years.79 The mandatory redemption resulted in an asset sales that 
shrunk the corporation significantly and impaired its ability to generate long-
term value to the remaining stockholders.80 
Notwithstanding the fact that the court recognized the mandatory 
redemption provision as a contractual obligation toward the preferred, it 
emphasized that the preferred right to redeem their stock once the mandatory 
redemption right vested was subject to the board’s fiduciary duty to decide 
whether it was in the best interests of the common stockholders (i.e., not the 
enterprise as a whole) to commit an “efficient breach” of the corporation’s 
obligation toward the preferred. In ODN, the best interest of the common 
                                                          
 74. See id. Both the first negotiation, for a sale at a deal price of $45,000,000, with another 
$17,000,000 as part of a potential earn-out (common stockholders could have potentially received only 
part of the earn-out consideration; $0.38 per share), and the second negotiation, for a sale at a deal price 
between $31,000,000 and $37,000,000 (i.e., the offer would not have satisfied the corporation’s preferred 
stock), ultimately failed due to concerns that the corporation’s business depended on a single customer. 
 75. Defendants claimed that the price at which common stockholders would receive consideration 
was $53,189,000, as compared with the $33,800,000 merger price alleged by plaintiff. See id. at *28. 
 76. See id. at *26-29. 
 77. See id. at *28-29. 
 78. See generally Carsanaro v. Bloodhound Tech., Inc., 65 A.3d 618 (Del. Ch. 2013); SV Inv. 
Partners, LLC v. ThoughtWorks, Inc., 37 A3d 205 (Del. 2011); SV Inv. Partners, LLC v. Thoughtworks, 
Inc., 7 A.3d 973 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff’d, 37 A.3d 205 (Del. 2011); Harbinger Capital Partners Master Fund 
I, Ltd. v. Granite Broad. Corp., 906 A.2d 218 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
79.  See Fredrick Hsu Living Trust v. ODN Holding Corp. et al., 2017 WL 1437308 (Del. Ch. Apr. 
14, 2017). 
80.  Id. 
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stockholders was not to take actions to fund the redemption, because doing 
so diminished the long-term upside potential of the business.81 
 
B. ISSUES POST-TRADOS AND ODN 
 
Following the Delaware Chancery Court’s holdings in Trados and 
ODN, scholars took different views with respect to these decisions. Some 
praised or otherwise supported the court’s view,82 whereas others criticized 
it to a large extent.83 Additionally, law firms have focused on the practical 
implications of these cases to provide guidelines for their clients.84 
The current criticism of conflicts among stockholders has yet to result 
in a comprehensive and unified resolution. This Article takes a closer look 
at the legal reasoning and foundations of the court’s rationale in Trados and 
ODN, and critiques the court’s underlying assumptions in these cases.85 It 
also discusses potential interclass preference conflicts and argues that the 
court’s approach lacks a solution with respect to interclass preference 
conflicts, for both privately held and publicly traded corporations.86 
                                                          
 81. See id. at *53-54. For prior case law recognizing the “efficient breach” doctrine, see, e.g., Bhole, 
Inc. v. Shore Invs., Inc., 67 A.3d 444, 453 n.39 (Del. 2013); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 
679 A.2d 436, 445–46 (Del. 1996); NAMA Hldgs., LLC v. Related WMC LLC, 2014 WL 6436647, at 
*30 (Del. Ch. Nov. 17, 2014). 
 82. See supra note 23. 
 83. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9 (arguing that enterprise value maximization works better 
as the default when the interests of two classes of equity are in conflict); Pollman, supra note 1, at 54 
(arguing that the Trados court took a formalistic approach to applying fiduciary duties without sensitivity 
to startup dynamics); Michal Barzuza & Eric Talley, Long-Term Bias, (ECGI Law, Working Paper No. 
449, 2019) (discussing long-term bias in light of recent Delaware case law and suggesting that long-
termism can impose substantial costs on investors that are every bit as damaging as short-termism); 
Robert P. Bartlett, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as Means to an End, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 255, 
295 (2015) (suggesting that Trados “undermin[ed] the utility of the corporate form as a vehicle for 
maximizing firm value, [and] potentially induc[ed] investors and entrepreneurs to turn to noncorporate 
entities to finance new business enterprises or deter[ed] investment altogether”); Sepe, supra note 15, at 
351-59 (suggesting that the Trados decision could violate investor’s participation constraints). Some 
scholars criticized the Trados court for concluding that the common stockholders were unharmed by the 
unfair dealing of the controlling preferred boards. See Adam M. Katz, Comment, Addressing the Harm 
to Common Stockholders in Trados and Nine Systems, 118 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 234 (2018); Ethan 
J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique, 125 YALE L.J. 1820 (2016); Ben 
Walther, The Peril and Promise of Preferred Stock, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 161 (2014). 
 84. See, e.g., M&A Update, Just How Preferred is Your Preferred?, KIRKLAND & ELLIS (May 9, 
2017), https://www.kirkland.com/publications/kirkland-manda-update/2017/05/just-how-preferred-is-yo 
ur-preferred; Steven E. Boschner & Amy L. Simmerman, The Venture Capital Board Member’s Survival 
Guide: Handling Conflicts Effectively While Wearing Two Hats, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2016); Delaware 
Court of Chancery Upholds Trados Transaction as Entirely Fair, WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI 
(Aug. 20, 2013), https://www.wsgr.com/publications/PDFSearch/wsgralert-trados.pdf. 
 85. See infra page 10, Part I.B. 
 86. See infra page 24, Part II. 
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This Article concludes with an alternative analytic consistent 
framework to resolve conflicts of interest between and among common-
preferred and interclass preferences.87 
 
i. Preferred Stockholders as Residual Claimants 
 
To initiate the critiques about the Delaware Chancery Court’s decisions, 
one of the first questions is: are the rights of the preferred contractual rights 
debt-like or equity rights? This question asks whether preferred stock is a 
debt or an equity instrument. Said more elaborately, do the preferred 
stockholders gain liquidity via their contractual rights (i.e., similar to 
creditors), or are they locked into their investment like other equity holders 
(i.e., common shareholders)?88 
The court’s position is that preferred stock, whether redeemable or not, 
is an equity rather than a debt instrument.89 However, the court has missed 
an important distinction: when analyzing equity and debt features of 
preferred stock, one should differentiate between redeemable preferred stock 
and non-redeemable preferred stock. This distinction is important for two 
principal reasons: First, it explains why, in the case of non-redeemable 
preferred stock, holders of preferred shares should be considered ‘residual 
claimants.’ Second, it sheds light on the expectations and goals of an investor 
when making an investment decision. Such expectations driving investor’s 
investments are important for analyzing the potential conflicts of interest 
between common and preferred stockholders. 
This Article will first lay out the core differences between redeemable 
and non-redeemable preferred stock from an accounting perspective and will  
then analyze the legal characteristics of each. 
Figure 1 below describes the main differences between non-redeemable 
and redeemable preferred stock: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 87. See infra page 33, Part III. 
 88. For an interesting discussion regarding the paradox of preferred stock and its dual function as a 
debt and equity instrument, see, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Puzzling Paradox of Preferred Stock 
(and Why We Should Care About It), 51 BUS. LAW. 443, 445 (1996). 
 89. See In re Trados Shareholder Litigation, 73 A.3d 17, 38 (Del. Ch. 2013); Fredrick Hsu Living 
Trust v. ODN Holding Corp. et al., 2017 WL 1437308, at *33-34 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2017).  
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Figure 1 
 
Characteristic Non- 
Redeemable 
Preferred 
(Equity) 
 
Redeemable 
Preferred (Debt) 
 
Redeemable Preferred 
(Equity/Debt) (?) 
 
Redeemable by 
investor 
No Yes Conditional redemption 
– instrument becomes 
debt once event 
occurs/condition is 
resolved/the event 
becomes certain to occur 
 
Mandatory 
Redemption by 
corporation 
 
No Yes No
 
Under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”),90 an 
investment in preferred stock that must be redeemed by the issuing entity, or 
is redeemable at the investor’s option, is considered a debt security, despite 
its legal form. This is the case regardless of how the issuer classified the 
instrument.91 
If the preferred stock is not mandatorily redeemable (i.e., there is no 
stated redemption date), and the investor does not have the unilateral right to 
ultimately redeem it, it is considered an equity security subject to the 
provisions of ASC 321, Investments—Equity Securities.92 
                                                          
 90. See Investments‐Debt and Equity Securities, ASC 320, https://asc.fasb.org/subtopic&trid=75 
115025; Financial Reporting Developments, A Comprehensive Guide: Certain Investments in Debt and 
Equity Securities, EY (June 2018), https://www.ey.com/publication/vwluassetsdld/financialreportingde 
velopments_03623-181us_debtandequitysecurities_14june2018-v2/$file/financialreportingdevelopment 
s_03623-181us_debtandequitysecurities_14june2018-v2.pdf. For simplicity of the discussion, I will 
focus on US GAAP, although there are some similarities to IFRS in this context. For differences in 
classification between debt and equity instruments between IFRS and U.S. GAPP, see A Comparison of 
IFRS Standards and U.S. GAAP: Bridging the Differences, DELOITTE (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.iasp 
lus.com/en/publications/us/ifrs-gaap-comparison; US GAAP Versus IFRS: The Basics, EY (Feb. 2018), 
https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/IFRSBasics_00901-181US_23February218/$FILE/IFRS 
Basics_00901-181US_23February2018.pdf; IFRS and US GAAP: Similarities and Differences, PWC 
(Oct. 2019), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/cfodirect/assets/pdf/accounting-guides/pwc-ifrs-us-gaap-simil 
arities-and-differences.pdf; IFRS Compared to US GAAP, KPMG (Dec. 2017), https://frv.kpmg.us/ 
content/dam/frv/en/pdfs/2017/ifrs-us-gaap-2017.pdf. 
 91. See EY, supra note 90, at 6-7. 
 92. Accounting Standards Codification, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, https://asc. 
fasb.org/subtopic&trid=2196929; see also id. 
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In complex situations in which the terms of a redeemable preferred 
stock allow the investor the option to redeem it only in certain circumstances 
(e.g., when an event occurs that is not certain to occur or when a certain 
percentage (e.g., majority, two-third) of investors elect to redeem their 
preferred shares), this conditional redemption becomes a liability (for the 
corporation) if that event occurs, the condition is resolved, or the event 
becomes certain to occur.93 
To simplify the following legal discussion, we focus on the pure non-
redeemable/redeemable preferred stock. 
From Figure 1, we can see that in the pure case of redeemable preferred 
stock (the second column), such an instrument is classified for, accounting 
purposes, as a debt rather than as an equity instrument. Under Delaware law, 
however, there is no distinction between redeemable preferred stock and 
non-redeemable preferred stock; both are considered equity instruments.94 
The rationale behind the court’s view is that each redemption right is subject 
to statutory, common law, and contractual limitations, including § 160 of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) which requires that a 
repurchase be made in an amount not to exceed the corporation’s “surplus.”95 
Therefore, the redemption right will always be conditioned upon the 
fulfilment of § 160 of the DGCL,96 and will be subordinated to the rights of 
the corporation’s creditors.97 
In the following subsections, this Article first discuss the legal 
characteristics of the nonredeemable preferred stock and will then continue 
with a separate discussion of the legal characteristics of the redeemable 
preferred stock. The analysis will show that, with respect to nonredeemable 
                                                          
 93. For useful illustrations and additional information as to whether the preferred stock is classified 
as debt or equity security in complex situations, see Certain Financial Instruments with Characteristics 
of Both Liabilities and Equity, KPMG, 26-27 (Nov. 2017), https://frv.kpmg.us/content/dam/frv/en/pd 
fs/2017/handbook-distinguishing-liabilities-asc480.pdf; EY, supra note 83, at 6-7. 
 94. See Fredrick Hsu Living Trust v. ODN Holding Corp. et al., 2017 WL 1437308, at *33-34 (Del. 
Ch. Apr. 14, 2017) (rejecting the idea that a preferred stockholder who holds a redemption right should 
be considered a “creditor”). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id.; see Carsanaro v. Bloodhound Tech., Inc., 65 A.3d 618, 645 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 97. See ODN Holding Corp., 2017 WL 1437308, at *33-34; accord 11 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER 
ET AL., FLETCHER’S CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5297 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 
2019) (“As against creditors of the corporation, preferred shareholders have no greater rights than 
common shareholders. They have no preference over them, either in respect to dividends or capital, and 
have no lien upon the property of the corporation, except if a statute provides otherwise. On the contrary, 
their rights, both in respect to dividends and capital are subordinate to the rights of such creditors, and 
consequently they are not entitled to any part of the corporate assets until the corporate debts are fully 
paid.”) (citations omitted); 11 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER’S CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW 
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5310 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 2019) (“As a general rule, the shareholder’s right 
to compel a redemption is subordinate to the rights of creditors.”). 
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preferred stock, the preferred stockholders should be considered “residual 
claimants,” thus, fiduciary duties are also owed to them. With respect to 
redeemable preferred stock, the “efficient breach” doctrine leaves the 
preferred stockholders without adequate protection of their rights and, 
therefore, even if they are not purely considered as “residual claimants,” the 
fiduciary duties should also be owed to them to protect their rights as 
stockholders. 
The conclusion that, both in the case of nonredeemable preferred stock 
and redeemable preferred stock, fiduciary duties are also owed to preferred 
stockholders raises the need for an alternative mechanism to resolve 
stockholders’ conflict of interest. This alternative mechanism will be 
discussed in Part III. 
 
1. Nonredeemable Preferred Stock 
 
Nonredeemable preferred stock typically contains liquidation 
preference, dividend rights, special voting rights, and anti-dilution rights.98 
As discussed above, the Delaware Chancery Court does recognize these 
rights as equity rights,99 but, due to their contractual nature, the court’s view 
is that such rights should be protected by their specific contractual terms and 
their holders should not be considered “residual claimants.”100 Therefore, 
fiduciary duties are not owed to preferred stockholders. However, by taking 
a closer look at the legal characteristics of the non-redeemable stock, this 
Article argues that the nonredeemable preferred stockholders should be 
considered “residual claimants” and should too be entitled to fiduciary 
protection. 
First, to initiate our discussion about nonredeemable preferred stock, 
the questions to be asked are as follows: what are preferred rights and what 
do they entail? 
The rights of preferred stock are typically listed in a corporation’s 
certificate of incorporation (“COI”).101 The COI is a binding contract 
between corporation stockholders and the corporation, governing the rights 
of each type of corporation’s stock. A COI is limited only to stockholders of 
the corporation; no other stakeholders’ rights are listed therein. This 
limitation draws the boundary between stockholders and other stakeholders 
                                                          
 98. See NVCA, supra note 3. 
 99. See In re Trados Shareholder Litigation, 73 A.3d 17, 38 (Del. Ch. 2013); ODN Holding Corp., 
2017 WL 1437308, at *33-34. 
 100. See Trados, 73 A.3d at 41; ODN Holding Corp., 2017 WL 1437308, at *50-51. 
 101. There are additional rights of the preferred stock that are listed in other contracts, such as voting 
agreements and investor rights agreements. 
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of the corporation, which, pursuant to the Delaware court’s point-of-view, 
the latter are not per se entitled to fiduciary duties.102 This puts the preferred 
stockholders in a similar position as common stockholders and different 
from other corporation’s stakeholders. Therefore, the rights and interests of 
the preferred listed in the COI, and agreed upon by the parties, should be 
considered and enforced, similar to common stockholders, at the equity level 
via the board of directors’ fiduciary duties. 
It bears noting that preferred stockholders receive additional rights, 
favorable to common stockholders’ rights. First, as explained above, the COI 
reflects an agreement between the corporation’s stockholders and the 
corporation. Just like common rights, preferred rights should be honored and 
the interests of the preferred should be considered at the equity level. Second, 
these additional rights aim to protect preferred stockholders’ (typically 
venture capitalists’) high-risk investment in start-ups and enable a productive 
mode of financing,103 which would otherwise not be received by alternate 
sources, such as banks.104 
Further, the additional rights do not convert the preferred rights into 
debt-like rights.105 These non-mandatory financial preferences are pure 
equity rights. Although their existence may create a misalignment with the 
common preferences and interests, this does not mean that they are debt-like 
rights or that, consequently, preferred stockholders should be considered 
creditors. Rather, it means that anytime the board of directors is considering 
taking a corporate action that is likely to result in a conflict of interest 
between the common and preferred, the board of directors should resolve the 
conflict at the equity level via its fiduciary duties to both common and 
preferred stockholders. The way in which the board of directors could 
resolve such conflict is through the fiduciary duty of impartiality, which this 
Article will discuss further in Part III. 
Second, just like any corporate decision, most of the preferred rights106 
are enforced de facto through a board of director’s fiduciary duty to take 
corporate action. For example, liquidation rights are primarily triggered after 
                                                          
 102. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, 170 N.W. 668, 683 (Mich. 1919); MELVIN A. EISENBERG, 
AM. LAW. INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 
(1994). 
 103. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1874; Sepe, supra note 15, at 357-58 (“Thus, the 
question in Trados should not have been whether the common shareholders would have been better or 
worse off had the merger not occurred, as the court assumed. Instead, it should have been whether the 
shareholders would have been better or worse off without the preferred financing…”) (citations omitted). 
 104. See Pollman, supra note 1, at 15. 
 105. By debt-like, I mean mandatory redemption or dividend rights. See Fletcher, supra note 97. 
 106. Some rights are not subject to corporate action, such as drag-along rights that empower the 
controlling stockholder to sell the company and force other stockholders to join in that sale. 
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a board of directors has approved the sale of the corporation. The same goes 
for dividend rights—the board of directors must declare a dividend 
distribution. This means that (almost) every time preferred stockholders 
enforce their rights, doing so will likely trigger a direct conflict with the 
common stockholders. 
This trigger is different from a situation in which a third party (e.g., a 
creditor) enforces its contractual rights because presumably the interests of 
the common and preferred in such a case will align; meaning that the board 
of directors would not have to address a conflict among the stockholders and 
will take corporate action that serves the best interests of all stockholders. 
Therefore, recognizing that preferred rights should be enforced only at the 
contractual level and not at the equity level, as a practical matter, means that 
preferred stockholders de facto do not enjoy the same contractual protection 
as third parties do. Whenever preferred stockholder interests do not align 
with the interests of the common stockholders, preferred will be at risk that 
their interests might not be considered because, per Trados, the directors will 
have the duty to maximize the value of the common stock. 
Third, the rights of preferred stockholders, although likely superior to 
the rights of common stockholders pursuant to the provisions of the COI, are 
subordinated to the rights of other stakeholders of the corporation (e.g., 
creditors).107 Furthermore, unlike other stakeholders of the corporation, the 
preferred stockholders are not entitled to enforce their rights as creditors,108 
including cashing out their investment.109 
For the aforementioned reasons stated in this sub-section, “. . . the duty 
to maximize enterprise value should encompass certain contract rights  
(those of preferred) but not others (those of creditors, employees, pensioners, 
customers, etc.).”110 
Finally, the Delaware Chancery Court’s current view does not enable 
consideration of different types of preferred stockholders.111 For example, 
the interests of preferred stockholders with a non-capped, 1X participating 
liquidation preference are more likely to align with those of the common 
stockholders. On the other extreme, if preferred liquidation preference is 3X 
nonparticipating, then it is more likely that the interests of the preferred 
stockholders will not be aligned with those of the common stockholders. 
There can be very different common-preferred conflicts of interest, each of 
                                                          
 107. See ODN Holding Corp., 2017 WL 1437308, at *33-34; supra note 90. 
 108. See In re Trados Shareholder Litigation, 73 A.3d 17, 38 (Del. Ch. 2013); see Fredrick Hsu Living 
Trust v. ODN Holding Corp. et al., 2017 WL 1437308, at *33-34 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2017). 
 109. See ODN, 2017 WL 1437308, at *33-34. 
 110. See Trados, 73 A.3d at 43. 
 111. See id. at 53. 
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which may result in different incentives as to the exit strategy of the preferred 
stockholders versus that of the common stockholders.112 
Another example of an impediment caused by the Delaware Chancery 
Court’s current view is an investment by a strategic investor or a corporate 
venture capital (“CVC”) investor.113 These types of investors have goals that 
may differ from traditional venture capitalists.114 Unlike the pure venture 
capitalist, in some cases, strategic/CVC investors are interested in investing 
in start-ups that fit their business models.115 In these cases, they will likely 
finance start-ups that have technologies that are complementary,116 in hopes 
of partnering for the long haul.117 Strategic/CVC investors’ involvement in a 
corporation’s business can be significant. They often provide channels to 
media, public relations, packages for customers, accelerate programs, 
product development, and so on.118 Lastly, they also maintain a tight 
investor-founder relationship.119 
Thus, due to their high involvement in a corporation’s business and 
long-term financial and business objectives, strategic/CVC investors may be 
less conflicted vis-à-vis the interests of the common stockholders (e.g., 
founders) than other preferred stockholders (e.g., venture capitalists). That 
said, some CVC investors, such as Google Ventures or Capital G, look far 
afield at interesting markets that do not necessarily relate at the time to their 
core business. Therefore, these types of CVC investors could have short 
investment horizons that diverge from those of the founders. In this context, 
the Trados dichotomic approach seems to make less sense, as it does not 
encompass the interests of the strategic investors/CVCs that may be more 
aligned with the interests of the common stockholders, or at the very least, 
differ from the interests of the traditional venture capitalists. 
 
 
 
                                                          
 112. See Smith, supra note 5, at 348. 
 113. See Thomas Hellmann, A Theory of Strategic Venture Investing, 64(2) J. FINANC. ECON. 285, 
287, 304 (2002). 
 114. See id.; see also Song Ma, The Life Cycle of Corporate Venture Capital, REV. OF FIN. STUD. 
(forthcoming), (manuscript at 1) (https://ssrn.com/abstract=2691210). 
 115. Symposium Notes, Case Studies: Creative Ways CVCs Move the Needle for Portfolio 
Companies, STANFORD & NVCA VENTURE CAPITAL (Mar. 27, 2019). 
 116. See Hellmann, supra note 113, at 304; see also Chemmanur, Thomas J., Elena Loutskina, & 
Xuan Tian, Corporate Venture Capital, Value Creation, and Innovation, 27(8) THE REV. OF FIN. STUD. 
2434, 2440 (2014). 
 117. See supra note 115. 
 118. See supra note 108; see also Cassie Ann Hodges, Building Better: Qualcomm Ventures & Brain Corp, 
NVCA BLOG (Apr. 19, 2019), https://nvca.org/blog/building-better-qualcomm-ventures-brain-corp/. 
 119. See supra note 108. 
1 + - NIR REWRITE ARTICLE--ONE DUTY TO ALL--SN COMMENTS 11.8.19 (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 
Winter 2020] ONE DUTY TO ALL 19 
 
2. Redeemable Preferred Stock 
 
Redeemable preferred stock typically contains all of the features of 
nonredeemable preferred stock and, in addition, includes a redemption 
right.120 Such a redemption right can be limited in time and may also be 
conditioned upon an event not certain to occur.121 For simplicity’s sake, this 
Article will assume that the redemption right is either mandatory or 
redeemable by the investor. 
As discussed in Part I above, under Delaware law, redeemable preferred 
stock is considered an equity instrument and is subject to statutory, common 
law, and contractual limitations.122 Under statutory law, § 160 of the DGCL 
requires that a repurchase be made in an amount not to exceed the 
corporation’s “surplus.”123 
Under common law requirements, a corporation cannot be forced to 
redeem preferred shares when it does not have “funds legally available” to 
make the redemption.124 As a general rule, the preferred rights to compel a 
redemption are subordinate to the rights of a corporation’s creditors.125 
An analysis of ODN and prior case law126 on redeemable preferred 
shares seems to put the preferred in a position where their redemption rights 
could be meaningless. Recall that in ODN, the Delaware Chancery Court 
held that preferred shareholders’ right to redeem their stock, once the 
mandatory redemption right had vested, is subject to the board’s fiduciary 
duty to decide whether it is in the best interests of the common stockholders 
(i.e., not the enterprise as a whole) to commit an “efficient breach” of the 
corporation’s obligation to the preferred.127 
Combining the “efficient breach” doctrine with preferred stockholders 
not being entitled to the protection of their contractual rights as creditors,128 
leads this Article to conclude that, with respect to their redemption right, the 
                                                          
     120.  See NVCA, supra note 3. 
     121.  See id. 
 122. See Frederick Hsu Living Trust v. ODN Holding Corp., 2017 WL 1437308, at *33-34 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 14, 2017).  
 123. See id. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See ODN Holding Corp., 2017 WL 1437308, at *33-34; supra note 97. 
 126. See Carsanaro v. Bloodhound Tech., Inc., 65 A.3d 618 (Del. Ch. 2013); SV Inv. Partners, LLC 
v. ThoughtWorks, Inc., 37 A3d 205 (Del. 2011); SV Inv. Partners, LLC v. Thoughtworks, Inc., 7 A.3d 
973 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff’d, 37 A.3d 205 (Del. 2011); Harbinger Capital Partners Master Fund I, Ltd. v. 
Granite Broad. Corp., 906 A.2d 218 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
 127. See ODN Holding Corp., 2017 WL 1437308, at *53-54 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2017). For prior case 
law recognizing the “efficient breach” doctrine, see, e.g., Bhole, Inc. v. Shore Invs., Inc., 67 A.3d 444, 
453 n.39 (Del. 2013); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 445–46 (Del. 1996); 
NAMA Hldgs., LLC v. Related WMC LLC, 2014 WL 6436647, at *30 (Del. Ch. Nov. 17, 2014). 
 128. See supra note 101. 
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interests and rights of the preferred stockholders are likely not to be taken 
into account by the board of directors when taking a corporate action. 
There is a significant concern that due to its lack of a fiduciary duty to 
preferred stockholders, the board of directors will likely justify its refusal to 
commence the redemption as a perfectly reasonable business decision 
because it is only required to consider the common stockholders’ interests.129 
This conclusion is reinforced in light of the Delaware Chancery Court’s 
approach that the board of directors should favor an investment that 
generates higher net returns for the common stockholders in lieu of 
complying with the corporation’s obligation to preferred stockholders.130 
Unlike contracts with third parties, each time the board of directors 
considers whether to commence an “efficient breach,” the only interests it 
will take into account in its decision-making process are those of the 
common stockholders. 
In light of the above, it is not surprising that there has been a significant 
decline in the use of redemption rights in financing rounds between 2018 and 
2017,131 which might suggest that venture capitalists are reluctant to invest 
in this instrument due to the uncertainty of enforcing such rights. 
Moreover, in ODN, because the amount of the redemption right was 
fixed due to a lack of a cumulative dividend, the Delaware Chancery Court 
argued that the directors should have used this fact as leverage for the benefit 
of the corporation and its common stockholders. In other words, the working 
premise should have been to commence an “efficient breach” instead of 
complying with the obligation to the preferred.132 
The National Venture Capital Association (“NVCA”) added an interest 
provision to its Model Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation 
for investors wanting to address the ODN court’s ruling and prior case law.133 
The interest provision was designed as an economic inducement for a 
corporation to affect redemption, or, at least, to provide compensation to 
preferred stockholders for a corporation’s failure to redeem.134 
                                                          
 129. For a similar argument, see Robert P. Bartlett & Eric L. Talley, Law and Corporate Governance, 
39, n. 106 (suggesting that the preferred stock redemption cannot be in the best interests of the residual 
claimants “since, by definition, liquidating will extinguish the common stockholder’s option value in 
favor of distributing the company’s remaining value to preferred stockholders”).  
 130. See Frederick Hsu Living Trust v. ODN Holding Corp., 2017 WL 1437308, at *55-56 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 14, 2017). 
 131. The use of redemption rights decreased from 19% of all financing rounds in 2017 to 9% of all 
financing rounds in 2018; see The Entrepreneurs Report: Private Company Financing Trend, WILSON 
SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI (2019), https://www.wsgr.com/publications/PDFSearch/entreport/Q4201 
8/EntrepreneursReport-Q4-2018.pdf. 
 132. See ODN Holding Corp., 2017 WL 1437308, at *89. 
 133. See NVCA, supra note 3. 
 134. See id. 
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However, the inclusion of an interest provision does not guarantee that 
the redemption right will be enforce because presumably it could be 
relatively easy for a board of directors to justify its long-term plan (for the 
benefit of the common stockholders) such that a delay of the redemption fee 
would be more efficient under the “efficient breach” doctrine. This leaves 
preferred stockholders without adequate protection of their rights. Such a 
decision by the board of directors would be protected by the business 
judgment rule.135 
Additionally, due the uncertainty in the enforcement of the redemption 
right, preferred stockholders could include specific terms of the preferred 
stock to protect their rights (such as the terms of the interest provision 
described above), resulting in an increase in transaction costs.136 That said, 
one may argue that in the case of redeemable stock, stockholders cannot be 
considered “residual claimants” as, by definition, they have not locked in 
their investment.137 Unlike nonredeemable preferred stockholders, after 
exercising their redemption right, preferred will cease to be stockholders. 
Indeed, the similarity of the redemption right to a debt instrument—
including that after the redemption, the stockholders would cease being 
stockholders of the corporation and, therefore, would not pursue any long-
term business goals that would generate long-term income—should be given 
a certain weight. But this weight should be considered and balanced in light 
of the specific set of circumstances. 
The analytical framework proposed in Part III below considers the 
interests of preferred stockholders in addition to the interests of common 
stockholders, without automatically favoring common stockholders’ 
interests. Pursuant to this proposed approach, the board of directors would 
consider the interests of all stockholders without prejudice. No benefit of one 
stockholder should be per se favored over the other, and the board of 
directors would resolve a conflict of interest via the duty of impartiality. The 
benefit of this test is that it does not restrict the board of directors to the 
“efficient breach” doctrine and allows it to take other considerations into 
account when reaching its decision—one that would best maximize the value 
of the corporation as a whole. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 135. See ODN Holding Corp., 2017 WL 1437308, at *55. 
 136. See infra, page 21, Part I.B.2.ii. 
 137. See In re Trados Shareholder Litigation, 73 A.3d 17, 34 (Del. Ch. 2013); ODN Holding Corp., 
2017 WL 1437308, at *47. 
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ii. Agency and Transaction Costs 
 
Recall that in both Trados and ODN, the Delaware Chancery Court held 
that the fiduciary duties of a corporation’s board of directors are owed to the 
common stockholders as residual claimants, with fiduciary duties owed to 
the holders of preferred stockholders only to the extent that both their 
interests overlap.138 
In the Introduction Part, this Article argued that by analyzing equity 
features from a legal perspective of nonredeemable preferred stock, holders 
of nonredeemable preferred stock should be considered “residual claimants.” 
Additionally, this Article argued that both in the case of nonredeemable and 
redeemable preferred stock, the enforcement of their rights, in many cases, 
is questionable and leaves preferred stockholders without adequate 
protection of their rights. 
In Part I.B.ii., this Article pointed out another problematic aspect of the 
dichotomic approach that the Delaware Chancery Court has taken: due to the 
uncertainty with respect to the enforcement of the preferred rights, a 
preferred stockholder who wishes to protect his or her rights would need to 
include specific terms of the preferred stock that would otherwise be 
protected through fiduciary duties.139 A lack of specific terms would be 
interpreted by the court as a waiver of the preferred right.140 The inclusion of 
such terms would likely increase transaction costs. An example of such a 
protection of preferred rights via inclusion of specific terms of the preferred 
stock was discussed in Trados II. There, the court pointed out the lack of a 
drag-along right that empowers venture capital funds to sell a corporation 
and force the other stockholders to sell their shares.141 
As a response to such a requirement, the NVCA revised its Model 
Voting Agreement to provide a put option for the benefit of the investor to 
redeem its investment, particularly in a case where board approval is needed 
and later refused.142 However, in this situation, if such put option was 
exercised by the preferred stockholder, it would be identical to ODN. The 
repurchase of preferred stock by the corporation (i.e., redemption right) 
requires a corporate action and would again result in an uncertainty for 
preferred stockholders as to the enforcement of their rights.143 This situation, 
indeed, requires preferred stockholders to devise creative contractual 
                                                          
 138. See Trados, 73 A.3d at 40-42; ODN Holding Corp., 2017 WL 1437308, at *44. 
 139. See Trados, 73 A.3d at 71. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See Model Voting Agreement, NVCA (Jan. 2018), https://nvca.org/resources/model-legal-
documents/. 
 143. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1890-93. 
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solutions to mitigate the likelihood that their rights or interests will be 
reserved and, consequently, will increases transaction costs.144 
Additionally, as a response to the Delaware Chancery Court’s view, 
preferred stockholders will also likely invest additional funds to monitor the 
directors’ activities, resulting in an increase in agency costs. Monitoring the 
directors’ activities could be accomplished up to a certain degree for two 
reasons. First, express contracts may be too costly because the agent’s 
decision-making will depend on information not available at the time of the 
engagement.145 Second, the contractual arrangements could mitigate the 
agency problem only to a limited extent.146 Therefore, the fiduciary 
obligation to the preferred stockholders serves to fill a gap in situations 
where there are no express contractual rights. 
 
iii. Value-Maximizing Issues 
 
One of the primary questions in Trados was whether a board of 
directors’ duty is to maximize the value of the common stock or the value of 
the enterprise as a whole whenever a conflict arises between the common 
and the preferred stockholders. The Delaware Chancery Court’s view in 
Trados I (and affirmed in Trados II) is that the duty to maximize the value 
of the corporation is to its common stockholders, as residual claimants.147 
The Bratton and Wachter article, published immediately prior to the 
court’s decision in Trados II, provided an example of a scenario in which 
Trados can lead to decisions that are not value maximizing. The example 
given in the Bratton and Wachter article is as follows: 
 
                                                          
 144. For additional examples of such protection of rights via inclusion of specific terms of the 
preferred stock, see Frederick Hsu Living Trust v. ODN Holding Corp., 2017 WL 1437308, at *88-89 
(Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2017). The ODN court noted that absent an increasing redemption obligation, the 
holders of redeemable stock are in a relatively weak contractual position to force the corporation to 
redeem its shares. This concern was addressed by the NVCA by adding an interest provision to the Model 
Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation designed as an economic inducement for the 
corporation to effect the redemption, or, at least, to provide compensation to the preferred stockholder for 
the company’s failure to redeem; see NVCA, supra note 3; see also Kirkland & Ellis, supra note 84 
(“[I]nvestors may want to consider including in the specific terms of the preferred stock automatic 
disincentives to fail to satisfy those obligations …”). 
 145. See Kostritsky, supra note 23, at 57. 
 146. See id. at 55 (“So while, theoretically, the parties could control agency costs through contract, 
financial economics suggests that ‘[c]ontracts can be designed to enable a principal to mitigate agency 
problems, but agency problems can never be fully eliminated.’”) (quoting DOUGLAS J. CUMMING & SOFIA 
A. JOHAN, VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY CONTRACTING: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
44 (2d ed. 2014)). 
 147. See In re Trados Shareholder Litigation, 2009 WL 2225958, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009); In 
re Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 73 A.3d 17, 40 (Del. Ch. 2013).  
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[A]ssume that the $60 million offer is on the table and that there 
are two possible outcomes if the offer is not accepted. There is a 
25% chance that a $70 million offer can be realized in the 
intermediate term and a 75% chance that the markets will turn down 
and $50 million will be the best offer available. The expected value 
of delay is $55 million ($70 million x .25 + $50 million x .75). Delay 
thus sacrifices $5 million of enterprise value in exchange for a 
chance to realize an expected $750,000 ($3 million × .25) for the 
common.148 
 
In the above scenario, maximizing value for the common stock 
sacrifices maximizing enterprise value.149 The court in Trados II criticized 
the enterprise value maximization approach and noted that scholars’ support 
of the enterprise value maximization approach “does not explain why the 
duty to maximize enterprise value should encompass certain contract rights 
(those of preferred) but not others (those of creditors, employees, pensioners, 
customers, etc.).”150 
As discussed in Part I, the rights of the preferred stockholders, although 
superior to the rights of the common stockholders, are not superior to the 
rights of other stakeholders of the corporation. Unlike other stakeholders of 
the corporation, preferred stockholders are not entitled to enforce their rights 
as creditors, including cashing out their investment. Therefore, the duty to 
maximize enterprise value should also encompass preferred stockholders’ 
rights and interests. 
 
II. FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND INTERCLASS PREFERENCE 
CONFLICT OF INTERESTS 
 
Trados and ODN, discussed in Part I, focused on horizontal conflict of 
interests between preferred and common stockholders. In addition to the 
common-preferred conflict of interest, there are also interclass preference 
conflicts between and among different types of preferred and common 
stockholders.151 The current approach taken by the Delaware Chancery Court 
                                                          
 148. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1886 (citations omitted). 
 149. For an additional scenario in which maximizing value for the common sacrifices maximizing 
enterprise value, see, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 83, at 255-256; see also Pollman, supra note 1, at 8 
(suggesting that a better approach to value maximization “recognizes the corporation itself as the 
beneficiary of the fiduciary duties, representing the firm value and the interests of all startup 
participants”). 
 150. See Trados, 73 A.3d at 43. 
 151. See, e.g., Pollman, supra note 1, at 22, 30-37 (analyzing the different horizontal conflicts that 
arise in privately held startups: preferred versus. common, preferred versus preferred, and common versus 
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lacks a solution with respect to interclass preference conflicts both for 
privately held and publicly traded corporations. 
In Part II, this Article will discuss potential interclass preference 
conflicts between and among different types of preferred and common 
stockholders. The discussion will show that such conflicts do exist and, thus, 
creates a need for a consistent analytical framework to resolve such conflicts. 
This framework will be discussed in Part III. 
 
A. POTENTIAL CONFLICTS IN PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 
 
In recent years, in the context of privately held corporations, there has 
been an entrance into late-stage start-ups of different types of investors, such 
as mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds, and sovereign wealth funds.152 
Each investor could have different dividend, liquidation, control, voting 
rights, and other various protective terms.153 Adding to this complex capital 
structure, a recent trend has arisen of using proceeds from financing rounds 
to do share buybacks or to facilitate third party buyers. Examples include 
large institutional investors making secondary tender offers and allowing 
stockholders to sell some of their holdings and bring new investors into the 
corporation, but not necessarily under the same contractual terms of the 
previous investor.154 
Among others, one of the issues with a secondary transaction is that, 
unlike the initial investor (presumably the venture capitalist), the subsequent 
purchaser who typically buys the preferred stock in a mutual fund does not 
have an opportunity to bargain for contractual protection against the loss of 
certain contractual protections that were available to the initial purchaser.155 
                                                          
common); Bartlett & Talley, supra note 129, at 42-43 (suggesting that interclass preference conflicts have 
“long characterized private companies” and “now inform debates about public company governance, 
requiring close attention to the legal tools used to wage and resolve these conflicts;” such interclass 
preference conflicts “may force a reconsideration of whether the legal governance ‘tools’ … are effective 
in resolving them” and “rais[e] profound questions about whether fiduciary duties should rescale 
themselves”); Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the 
Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 40, 63, 108-09 (2006) (suggesting that horizontal conflict exists 
among venture capitalists themselves and expending its model to both private and public corporations). 
 152. See Pollman, supra note 1, at 18; Sergey Chernenko, Josh Lerner & Yao Zeng, Mutual Funds as 
Venture Capitalists? Evidence from Unicorns 2 (Harvard Business School, Working Paper No. 18-037, 
2017); Bartlett & Talley, supra note 129, at 37. 
 153. See Pollman, supra note 1, at 18-19; Will Gornall & Ilya A. Strebulaev, Squaring Venture 
Capital Valuations with Reality (NBER Working Paper No. 23895, 2017); Bartlett & Talley, supra note 
129, at 37. 
 154. See Pollman, supra note 1, at 19; see also Lizanne Thomas, Robert A. Profusek & Lyle G. 
Ganske, Share Buybacks Under Fire, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV’T AND FIN. REG. (May 21, 2019), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/05/21/share-buybacks-under-fire/. 
 155. Some rights, such as those included in shareholders agreements, will not transfer to the 
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In addition to the entrance of new types of investors, ‘existing’ 
investors, both preferred (e.g., venture capitalists, angels, and CVCs) and 
common (e.g., founders and employees) may have conflicting interests in 
taking certain actions due to the different types of equity interest they hold 
that vary in their terms and preferences. For example, different venture 
capitalists, depending on the time they invest in a corporation, have varying 
financial interests.156 
Figures 2 and 3 below demonstrate a potential conflict of interest that 
can arise among different types of venture capitalist with respect to an IPO 
and selling a corporation. 
 
Figure 2  
 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
                                                          
subsequent purchaser of the preferred. Further, the subsequent purchaser will likely not pay a lower price 
for the lack of such contractual protection due to difficulty with pricing the fall-off, or absence of such 
protections, that make the absence of fiduciary protection more critical. See Kostritsky, supra note 23, at 
102-09. 
     156.  See Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the 
Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 100 (2006). 
Stock Pre-Money 
Valuation 
Investment Number of 
Shares 
Participation 
Common — $400K 4M (PPS: $0.1) — 
Series A $400K $100K 1M (PPS: $0.1) Max: 3X Cap 
Series B $4M $1M 1.25M (PPS: 
$0.8) 
Max: 5X Cap 
Series C $40M $15M 2.34M (PPS: 
$6.4) 
Max: 5X Cap 
Series D $60M $70M 5M (PPS $14.0) Full 
Total — $86.5M 13.59M — 
Stockholders Proceeds IPO – $120M M&A – $120M 
Common $35.32M $10.26M 
Series A $8.83M $2.56M 
Series B $11.03M $4.08M 
Series C $20.66M $20.76M 
Series D $44.15M $82.32M 
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If a corporation is considering an exit event and begins a dual-track 
process (i.e., IPO and M&A search), what potential conflicts between the 
different series of preferred listed in Figure 2 might arise? 
Assuming that upon an IPO all stocks are converted into common stock, 
the common stockholders and early stage investors (Series A and Series B) 
are far better off with an IPO than a sale at $120M (see Figure 3 above). This 
creates a conflict between the common stockholders and Series A and Series 
B investors versus the Series C and Series D investors. 
The stockholders are likely to anticipate these potential conflicts and 
include contractual protections in their investment documents, such as 
special veto rights, special liquidation preference, and automatic conversion 
provisions.157 However, the ability to predict such conflicts is not always 
easy to discern and incomplete contracts are inevitable. Thus, the 
misalignment cannot be entirely eliminated.158 
Conflicts can also arise among common stockholders, such as among 
angel investors, founders, and management. Angel investors are wealthy 
individuals who personally finance the same high-risk, high-growth start-
ups as venture capitalists, but at an earlier stage.159 They typically receive 
common stock160 but their interests can diverge from those of founders and 
management with respect to everyday corporate decision-making.161 
Further, there could also be a misalignment among the angel investors 
themselves.162 
Indeed, the start-up complex capital structure involves serving 
different types of stockholders with different contractual terms, rights, and 
interests. It is likely to create conflicts not only between the preferred and 
common stockholders, but also between and among these diverse types of 
stockholders. 
Under the current Delaware Chancery Court’s view in Trados and 
ODN, the board of directors would resolve common-preferred conflicts 
under the common maximization value doctrine and would, thus, lack the 
required framework to resolve interclass preference conflicts of interest, 
such as those described above. 
Although scholars have articulated interclass preference conflicts 
between and among preferred and common stockholders,163 they have yet to 
                                                          
 157. See Bartlett, supra note 156, at 74-77. 
 158. See Pollman, supra note 1, at 16, 34; Bartlett, supra note 156, at 75-76. 
 159. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 
1405, 1406 (2008). 
 160. See id. at 1422. 
 161. See Pollman, supra note 1, at 35. 
 162. See Ibrahim, supra note 159, at 1425. 
 163. See supra note 151. 
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provide a comprehensive framework to resolve such conflicts. These 
scholars provide an enormous contribution to the understanding of the 
various conflicts. Scholars have argued that due to the complexity of the 
start-up capital structure, stockholders are heterogeneous in their 
preferences.164 They have also suggested that with the increase of the number 
and types of investors, with diverging interests over time, it is even more 
important to reach a suboptimal outcome that would encompass the interests 
of the corporation as a whole.165 
This Article builds on these findings and aims to fill the gap of conflict 
resolution by providing a comprehensive framework to resolve stockholders’ 
conflict of interest. This framework will be discussed in Part III. 
Before discussing the proposed framework and completing the 
discussion regarding potential stockholders’ conflicts, this Article will 
discuss the potential implications of horizontal conflicts of interest in the 
public corporation context. 
 
B. POTENTIAL CONFLICTS IN PUBLIC CORPORATIONS 
 
In general, once a corporation goes public, all shares of preferred stock 
are automatically converted into shares of common stock, immediately prior 
to complementing the IPO.166 
Recall that the Delaware Chancery Court’s holdings in Trados and 
ODN applies only where there is a conflict of interest between the preferred 
and the common stockholders.167 Once the corporation is public, Trados and 
ODN would not apply because there are no longer preferred shares and 
common stock has the same cash-flow rights (though not necessarily the 
same voting rights, as discussed below). 
Yet, as mentioned above, potential horizontal conflicts among 
interclasses preferences exist in the private corporation context. In recent 
years, such conflicts have also arisen in the public corporation context. For 
example, “horizontal governance disputes have also begun to permeate 
public corporation governance disputes as well,”168 raising profound 
questions about whether fiduciary duties should rescale themselves.169 
In a public corporation context, potential horizontal conflict of interest 
can take place primarily in two forms: shareholders activism or dual-class 
                                                          
 164. See id. 
 165. See Pollman, supra note 1, at 56. 
 166. See Bartlett, supra note 156, at 75. 
 167. See supra page 5, Part I. 
 168. See Bartlett & Talley, supra note 129, at 39. 
 169. Id. at 42-43. 
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capital structure. Both of these forms have recently arisen in the context of 
public corporations’ disputes and “may force a reconsideration of whether 
the legal governance ‘tools’ . . . are effective in resolving them” and “raising 
profound questions about whether fiduciary duties should rescale 
themselves.”170 
 
i. Shareholder Activism 
 
Shareholder activism is a way in which shareholders influence a 
corporation’s behavior by exercising their rights as shareholders. Two types 
of activism primarily exist. First, economic activism focuses primarily on 
steps seeking to increase stock price (e.g., demanding a sale of the company, 
spin-off, strategic and governance changes, share repurchases/dividends, and 
M&A related demands). Second, governance activism focuses primarily on 
issues and principles and augmenting economic activism (e.g., takeover 
defenses, board structural issues, director election issues, compensation, and 
risk management).171 
Shareholder activism is one of the most predominant governance 
disputes in public corporations today. In its extreme form, activism is 
claimed to weaken corporations by imposing a short-term perspective on 
managers172 over more durable, but less liquid, investments in long-term 
value.173 In that sense, activists take on a functional role analogous to that of 
preferred stockholders.174 For example, according to the Lazard’s 1Q 2019 
Activism Review, 46% of activist campaigns launched in Q1 2019 were 
M&A-driven, with ‘pushing for a sale’ being the most common M&A 
objective.175 
Similar to preferred stockholders, it has been argued that activists 
pursue short-term gain, running in sharp contrast with long-term investors’ 
interests, such as index funds, pension funds, insurance corporations, and 
many individual investors who often hold their stock for years.176 Critics 
argue that shareholder activism has “very serious adverse effects on the 
                                                          
 170. Id. at 43. 
 171. See generally CLAIRE HILL, BRIAN JM QUINN & STEVEN DAVIDOFF SOLOMON, MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS LAW, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 707-28, 735-51, 761-68 (2016). 
 172. See Ed deHaan, David Larcker & Charles McClure, Long-Term Economic Consequences of 
Hedge Fund Activist Interventions 1 (ECGI Finance, Working Paper No. 577, 2018). 
 173. See Bartlett & Talley, supra note 129, at 40. 
 174. See id. 
 175. See Review of Shareholder Activism - Q1 2019, Lazard’s Shareholder Advisory Group (Apr. 
2019), https://www.lazard.com/media/450943/lazards-q1-2019-review-of-shareholder-activism.pdf. 
 176. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
1255, 1290-1291 (2010); see also J. Travis Laster & John Mark Zeberkiewicz, The Rights and Duties of 
Blockholder Directors, 70 BUS. LAW. 33, 50 (2014-15). 
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corporations, their long-term shareholders, and the American economy.”177 
In contrast, proponents argue that shareholder activism improves operating 
performance and long-term returns.178 
Leo Strine, the former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, 
laid out a few suggestions to address this concern, but his suggestions 
focused on the duty of the asset managers to pursue the interests of the long-
term investor. His suggestions do not include the horizontal conflict between 
short-term and long-term investors, and the way in which corporations’ 
boards of directors should resolve such conflict.179 
Recent studies show that management, incentivized by short-horizon 
investors through short-term pay, takes actions that increase the short-term 
speculative component in stock prices, at the expense of long-term firm 
value.180 Further stating that there is no evidence that activist attacks result 
in long-term improvements in accounting performance measures.181 In 
contrast, a recent study shows that long-term projects are systematically 
susceptible to overestimation by managers, creating a long-term bias that can 
impose substantial costs on investors that are just as damaging as short-
termism.182 
As scholars, courts, and regulators continue to debate the implications 
and economic consequences of shareholder activism, such debates reflect 
horizontal conflict between stockholders with different investment horizons. 
Indeed, public corporations’ stockholders have heterogeneous preferences, 
and often find themselves at economic odds with each other, with the sources 
of conflict increasing.183 
                                                          
 177. See Martin Lipton, Empiricism and Experience; Activism and Short-Termism; the Real World of 
Business, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV’T & FIN. REG. (Oct. 28, 2013), https://corpgov.law.harva 
rd.edu/2013/10/28/empiricism-and-experience-activism-and-short-termism-the-real-world-of-business/. 
 178. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund 
Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (2015); Lucian Bebchuk, The Myth of Hedge Funds as ‘Myopic 
Activists’, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2013). 
 179. See Leo E. Strine, Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the 
Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (2014). 
 180. See Martijn Cremers, Ankur Pareek & Zacharias Sautner, Short-Term Investors, Long-Term 
Investments, and Firm Value: Evidence from Russell 2000 Index Inclusions, MGMT. SCI. (forthcoming 
2019) (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2720248). 
 181. See deHaan, Larcker & McClure, supra note 172. 
 182. See Barzuza & Talley, supra note 83. 
 183. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 176, at 1284. See also Caleb Griffin, We Three Kings: 
Disintermediating Voting at the Index Fund Giants, MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 13-
14) (https://ssrn.com/abstract=3365222) (discussing the diversity of individual index fund investors and 
suggesting that, if given the option, some of them would assuredly sacrifice financial gains for 
environmental or social benefits, while others would not choose to do so); Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should 
Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 174 (2008) (noting that shareholders have 
differing interests). 
1 + - NIR REWRITE ARTICLE--ONE DUTY TO ALL--SN COMMENTS 11.8.19 (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 
Winter 2020] ONE DUTY TO ALL 31 
 
Consequently, perhaps one of the most obvious questions is: what are 
the implications of this long-short termism debate on directors’ fiduciary 
duties? 
In Trados, Vice Chancellor Laster took the view that directors should 
maximize the long-term value of the common stockholders as residual 
claimants.184 Laster’s “long-term rule” was further extended to other 
situations in which directors represented activist stockholders having a short-
term horizon.185 This approach, however, seems far-reaching because the 
predominate view gives directors discretion to determine the time horizon 
over which they seek to maximize stockholder value.186 Further, it is in 
contrast to the prior Delaware Supreme Court decision in Paramount 
Communications Inc. v. Time Inc.187 that explicitly held that directors have 
discretion in managing the affairs of the corporation, including time horizon. 
The court stated that “. . .the question of ‘long-term’ versus ‘short-term’ 
value is largely irrelevant because directors, generally, are obliged to chart a 
course for a corporation which is in its best interests without regard to a fixed 
investment horizon.”188 
Among the suggestions of Leo Strine,189 there was no suggestion with 
respect to the way in which corporations’ boards of directors should resolve 
conflicts of interest between long-term versus short-term investors.190 
Additionally, the refusal of Chancellor Strine in In re Synthes, Inc. 
Shareholder Litigation to recognize that there is an inherent conflict of 
interest whenever there is a controlling stockholder with a short-term 
horizon191 suggests that the “long-term rule” has yet been accepted by the 
Supreme Court of Delaware. Instead, it suggests that the predominate view 
today is that, according to DGCL § 141, directors have discretion in taking 
corporate action, including setting a time horizon that would maximize the 
value of the corporation as a whole.192 
The above line of cases and literature leaves us at a point where there is 
no clear framework for corporations’ boards of directors to apply in their 
decision-making process when weighing different corporate opportunities 
                                                          
 184. See In re Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 73 A.3d 17, 34 (Del. Ch. 2013); see also In re 
Rural/Metro Corporation Shareholders Litigation, 102 A.3D 205, 253 (Del. Ch. 2014).  
 185. See Laster & Zeberkiewicz, supra note 176, at 50. 
 186. See Jack Bodne, Leonard Chazen & Donald Ross, VC Laster, Fiduciary Duties and the Long-
Term Rule, LAW 360 (Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2015/03 
/vc_laster_fiduciary_duties_and_the_long_term_rule.pdf. 
 187. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
 188. See id. at 1150. 
 189. See Strine, supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 190. See id. 
 191. 50A.3d 1022, 1039 fn. 81 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
 192. See Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1150; see also Bodne, Chazen & Ross, supra note 186. 
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with short- and/or long-term implications for a corporation’s stockholders as 
a whole. This conclusion calls for a legal framework that could encompass 
these different preferences and conflicting interests that public stockholders 
have and balance them to reach an outcome that maximizes the value of the 
enterprise as a whole.  
The proposed framework in Part III will, among other things, address 
situations where a board of directors faces a corporate decision that could 
result in different consequences for a certain group of stockholders, but 
nonetheless would be in the best interests of the stockholders as a whole. 
The additional effects of the above line of cases and literature 
concerning the standard of review and the vertical conflicts of interest that 
directors appointed by venture capitalists or activists face, will be discussed 
in Part III in conjunction with the discussion on the standard of review.193 
 
ii. Dual/Multi-Class Stock 
 
Horizontal conflicts among stockholders may arise also in corporations 
with dual-class capital structure, wherein the voting rights are not equal 
among all stockholders.194 Founders and early investors will typically 
reserve a significant amount of voting power to maintain control over the 
board of directors and strategic decisions.195 
Take Dropbox, Inc. (“Dropbox”) for example. Dropbox has three types 
of common stock, all with the same cash-flow rights196 but different voting 
rights. Class A common stock has one vote per share, Class B common stock 
has ten votes per share, and Class C common stock has no voting rights.197 
Class C common stock is to be issued to Dropbox employees under an 
equity-based plan.198 Class B common stock is held by the two co-founders, 
two officers, one independent director, and the venture capital Sequoia 
Capital (including its affiliates).199 
The two co-founders jointly hold approximately 55.3% of the total 
voting power200 and, therefore, are able to control all corporate matters 
submitted to stockholders for approval, including a sale of the corporation.201 
                                                          
 193. See infra page 40, Part III.C. 
194.  See Pollman, supra note 1, at 25. 
 195. See id. 
 196. IPO price was $21 per share. See Dropbox, Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4) (Mar. 23, 2018). 
 197. See Dropbox, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 33 (Feb. 25, 2019). 
 198. As of February 19, 2019, no Class C common stock have been issued. See id. 
199.  See Dropbox, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), 51-2, (Apr. 9, 2019). 
 200. The co-founders’ voting power as with respect to all shares of Class A common stock and Class 
B common stock, as a single class. See id. 
201.  See Dropbox, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), 33, (Feb. 25, 2019). 
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Class A common stock is held by the public, the co-founders, and the 
executive officers and directors. Due to the relatively small number of 
outstanding shares of Class A common stock after the Dropbox IPO and the 
number of shares of Class A common stock held by the co-founders as a 
result of their RSAs (having full voting rights), the co-founders maintain 
significant influence over any vote of the Class A common stock when 
voting as a separate class.202 
One can see that there is a potential conflict of interest between the co-
founders and the other holders of Class A common stock, in addition to a 
potential conflict of interest between Sequoia Capital and the two co-
founders. Each of these groups largely have their own investment agendas. 
For example, Sequoia Capital, as a venture capitalist, may or may not share 
the same investment horizon as the co-founders. Likewise, the co-founders 
may or may not share the same investment horizon as the other holders of 
Class A common stock—specifically when comparing the co-founders’ 
interests and preferences, which are typically long-term as compared to those 
of the venture capitalists, who typically have a short-term investment 
horizon.203 
Interestingly, out of the major three investors who received the IPO 
Class B common stock,204 two (T. Rowe Price and Accel) chose to convert 
all their Class B common stock to Class A common stock,205 which suggests 
that they prefer short-term liquidity over long-term investment horizon 
because they can sell the Class A common stock on the market. 
In light of the fact that horizontal conflicts of interest exist, what should 
the board of directors of a public corporation consider when taking a 
corporate action? Presumably it should consider the best interests of the 
stockholders as a whole, but what happens when the board of directors faces 
a significant conflict of interest? How should the board of directors resolve 
it? Should it surrender to the whims of the founder who presumably plays by 
the “long-term rule,” or is there a risk that the founder might actually behave 
in an opportunistic way that harms other stockholders? 
Next, take Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”) as an example. Last year, a major 
pension fund sued the directors of Facebook for being too accommodating to 
co-founder and controlling stockholder Mark Zuckerberg’s proposal to issue 
non-voting stock so that he could continue to pursue his personal philanthropic 
agenda without having to sell the vast majority of his Facebook stock and, 
                                                          
 202. See id. 
 203. See Korsmo, supra note 23, at 1169 (“[A] time horizon ranging from a year or two to as long as 
ten years, followed by ‘exit’ through an initial public offering (“IPO”) or sale of the entire enterprise.”). 
 204. Sequoia Capital, T. Rowe Price and Accel. 
205.  Compare Dropbox, Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4), 166, (Mar. 23, 2018) with supra note 199. 
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consequently, lose control over Facebook.206 
Similar to Dropbox, Facebook has a dual-class capital structure wherein 
Class B stock carries ten votes per share and Class A stock carries only one 
vote per share. Zuckerberg’s proposal was to issue a new class of publicly 
listed non-voting Class C stock.207 According to Zuckerberg’s 
reclassification plan, Facebook would issue two Class C stocks as a one-time 
dividend to each outstanding Class A and Class B stock, thereby tripling the 
total number of Facebook outstanding stock.208 The effect would further tilt 
control in Zuckerberg’s favor, reflating the voting weight of his Class B 
stock holdings and allowing Zuckerberg to liquidate stock for his personal 
goals without surrendering his hold on Facebook voting power.209 
Unlike Dropbox, the plan to issue the non-voting shares came after the 
IPO and was clearly not part of Facebook registration statement back in 
2012.210 Thus, such reclassification would, at the very least, require a 
legitimate business purpose and to bring some value to Facebook public 
stockholders. No such value or legitimate business purpose was found in this 
case.211 The members of the special committee who approved the 
reclassification plan were found in breach of their fiduciary duties. The 
Delaware Chancery Court found that they were “hopelessly biased, or 
otherwise woefully disregarded their Facebook fiduciary duties” to 
Facebook’s Class A stockholders and the corporation212 “by favoring 
Zuckerberg’s interests at the expense of the public Class A stockholders’ 
economic and voting rights.”213 
Indeed, this is an extreme case in which it is obvious that the opportunistic 
behavior of Zuckerberg harmed Facebook’s public stockholders. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that due to heterogeneous time horizons and agendas 
of investors,214 a horizontal conflict of interest does exist215 and is likely to 
                                                          
 206. See United Food and Commercial Workers Union and Participating Employers Tri-State Pension 
Fund v. Zuckerberg, 2018-0671, 2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 12, 2018). 
 207. See id. at 4. 
 208. See id. 
 209. See id. at 3. 
210.  See Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Feb. 1, 2012). 
 211. See Zuckerberg, 2018-0671, at 2. 
 212. See id. at 2-3. 
 213. See id. at 39. 
 214. See Barzuza & Talley, supra note 83, at 52 (“[T]he founder might simply place idiosyncratic 
value on maintaining control, and is willing to incur the costs of doing so in the form of the price discount 
that outside investors will no doubt impose on the sale (particularly if they are short-term oriented.”). The 
argument with respect to the founder’s potential “long-term bias” was made in connection with the 
adoption of the dual class structure but can also be made in regard to decisions made by the founder 
following the IPO. 
 215. This is in spite of the equality in cash-flow rights. 
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increase in the future with the sophistication of capital markets.216 
The exercise outlined above is not to critique the multi-/dual-class 
capital structure of corporations, as scholars and regulators currently 
continue to debate.217 It is merely to recognize that such potential horizontal 
conflicts of interest exists and to further suggest in Part III a framework to 
resolve such interclass preferences conflicts.218 
 
III. THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF IMPARTIALITY 
 
In Part I above, this Article analyzed the Delaware Chancery Court’s 
view in Trados and ODN regarding the resolution of common-preferred 
conflict of interest and laid out arguments as to why the enforcement of 
preferred stockholders’ rights should be undertaken through the board of 
directors’ fiduciary duties to all stockholders without prejudice. 
In Part II above, this Article discussed the interclass preference conflicts 
between and among different types of preferred and common stock. It argued 
that the current approach taken by the court fails to provide a solution with 
respect to interclass preference conflicts, both for privately held and publicly 
traded corporations. This Part will propose the duty of impartiality as an 
alternative analytic-consistent framework for the analysis and resolution of 
common-preferred and interclass preference conflicts of interest. 
 
A. OVERVIEW AND RATIONALE 
 
The fiduciary duty of impartiality, along with the duty of loyalty and 
duty of prudence, is one of the three fundamental fiduciary duties of a 
trustee.219 It is the trustee’s duty to administer the trust in an impartial manner 
                                                          
 216. See Bartlett & Talley, supra note 129, at 39, 42; see also Thomas Franck, SEC Approves New 
Silicon Valley Stock Exchange Backed by Marc Andreessen, Other Tech Heavyweights, CNBC (May 10, 
2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/10/sec-approves-new-silicon-valley-stock-exchange-backed-by-
marc-andreessen-other-tech-heavyweights.html. Listing standards have not been set yet, but presumably 
may contain a “scaled voting” mechanism, in which the voting power of shares grows the longer the 
shares are held. 
 217. See, e.g., Commissioner Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Perpetual Dual-Class Stock: The Case Against 
Corporate Royalty, SEC (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/perpetual-dual-class-stock-
case-against-corporate-royalty; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual 
Dual-Class Stock, 101 VA. L. REV. 585 (2017); Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision 
and Corporate Control, 125 YALE L.J. 560 (2016); Letter from the Council of Institutional Investors to 
Edward S. Knight, Executive Vice President and General Counsel, NASDAQ OMX GROUP (Mar. 27, 
2014), https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2014/03_27_14_CII_letter_to_ 
nasdaq_one_share_one_vote.pdf; Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual 
Class Common Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 137–38 (1987). 
 218. See proposed framework infra page 34, Part III. 
 219. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, Ch. 15, Intro (AM. LAW INST. 2007). 
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with respect to the various beneficiaries of the trust.220 
In the United States, the fiduciary duty of impartiality is anchored in § 
79 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts,221 reflected in § 103 of the Uniform 
Principle and Income Act,222 § 803 of the Uniform Trust Code,223 and § 6 of 
the Uniform Prudent Investor Act224 that were enacted in most of the 
states.225 
Corporate law has long recognized the principal-agent relationship 
between directors (agents) and stockholders (principals), where directors 
must maximize stockholders’ wealth via their fiduciary duties to the 
corporate entity.226 Conversely, trustees owe their fiduciary duties directly to 
the trust beneficiaries227 and, consequently, will be personally liable to the 
trust beneficiaries in case of a breach of trust.228 
Because corporate law is primarily derived from agency law,229 the duty 
of impartiality of directors to a corporation’s stockholders, which is not an 
explicit part of the agent fiduciary duties,230 has been rarely analyzed or 
applied by courts in an intra-corporate context.231 Although this Article is not 
suggesting that directors should be viewed as occupying a trustee-like 
                                                          
 220. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 (AM. LAW INST. 2007). 
 221. See id. Although there is no explicit fiduciary duty of impartiality under the Employees’ 
Retirement Income Security Act, 29 USC §18.1104, the United States Supreme Court in Tibble v. Edison 
Int’l clarified that “[i]n determining the contours of an ERISA fiduciary’s duty, courts often must look to 
the law of trusts.” 135 U.S. 1823, 1828 (2015). And, consequently, applied the Restatement (Third) of 
Trusts. 
 222. See UNIFORM PRINCIPLE AND INCOME ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000). 
 223. See UNIFORM TRUST CODE (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000). 
 224. See UNIFORM PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994). 
 225. See Uniform Law Commission, https://www.uniformlaws.org/home (last visited May 16, 2019). 
 226. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 
(1980); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 
301 (1983); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL 
R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); see also Dodge v. Ford Motor 
Company, 170 N.W. 668, 683 (Mich. 1919); MELVIN A. EISENBERG, AM. LAW. INST., PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (1994). 
 227. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, Ch. 15, Intro (AM. LAW INST. 2007). 
 228. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, Ch. 18, Intro (AM. LAW INST. 2007). 
 229. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
 230. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). See also id. at § 8. 
 231. Citations of impartiality by Delaware courts in an intracorporate context typically address the 
impartiality of a board of directors (or a special litigation committee) facing a plaintiff’s demand to 
initiate, or refrain from entering, litigation on behalf of the corporation. See, e.g., Sandys v. Pincus, 152 
A.3d 124, 126 (Del. 2016); In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation, 824 A.2d 917, 939-40 (Del. Ch. 
2003). For proposals to implement impartiality analysis with regard to various beneficiaries, see AMIR 
LICHT, FIDUCIARY LAW: THE DUTY OF LOYALTY IN THE CORPORATION AND IN THE GENERAL LAW 225 
(2013). 
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position,232 it proposes the duty of impartiality as an analytic framework that 
allows a board of directors to analyze and resolve conflicts of interest 
between and among the corporation’s stockholders to best fulfill its fiduciary 
duties. 
As discussed in Part I, the fiduciary duties of a board of directors 
requires it to make business decisions that are in the best interest of 
corporation’s stockholders (i.e., the “shareholder primacy norm” or the 
“shareholder wealth maximization norm”).233 However, the way in which the 
board of directors should fulfill this duty is quite ambiguous, and its 
decisions will enjoy deference under the business judgment rule unless there 
is a credible allegation of a breach of duty of care, loyalty (including conflict 
of interest), or waste.234 
Thus, whenever facing a horizontal conflict of interest between and 
among the corporation’s stockholders,235 the board of directors has no clear 
and consistent framework to apply in its decision-making process when 
resolving such conflicts. 
Although some of this ambiguity was presumably mitigated by the 
Delaware Chancery Court in Trados and ODN by favoring the “common 
stockholder maximization value”236 (and by doing so resolved the common-
preferred conflict), for the reasons outlined in Part I above, this Article 
argues that the duty to maximize enterprise value should also encompass the 
preferred stockholders’ rights. 
Consequently, when facing a corporate decision that triggers a 
horizontal conflict of interest, whether such conflict arises among the 
common-preferred stockholders237 or the common-common stockholders238 
or any other potential inter-class preference conflict, the board of directors 
should resolve these conflicts in a way that would best reflect the interests of 
the corporation’s stockholders as a whole.239 
                                                          
 232. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 37 DUKE 
L.J. 879, 880 (1988) (suggesting that a corporation’s directors occupy a trustee-like position); Margaret 
M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85(2) VA. L. REV., 248, 291 
(1999) (suggesting that corporate directors resemble trustees). See also the decision of the Supreme Court 
of Texas in Yeaman v. Galveston City Co., 167 S.W. 710, 723 (Tex. 1914) (holding that the relationship 
between a corporation and its stockholders are akin to one of trust). 
 233. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); Smith, supra note 31; see 
also eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del Ch. 2010). 
 234. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) (explaining justifications for the 
business judgment rule). 
 235. See discussion supra page 5, Part I and page 24, II. 
 236. See discussion supra page 5, Part I. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See discussion supra page 24, Part II. 
 239. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); Smith, supra note 31; see 
also eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del Ch. 2010). 
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B. RESOLVING STOCKHOLDERS’ CONFLICTS VIA THE FIDUCIARY DUTY 
OF IMPARTIALITY 
 
The proposed framework for resolving conflicts of interest between and 
among holders of common stock and multiple classes of preferred stock is 
through the fiduciary duty of impartiality. 
The duty of impartiality is the duty to administer the corporation’s affairs in 
a manner that is impartial with respect to the various beneficiaries (stockholders) 
of the corporation.240 It is an extension of the duty of loyalty.241 The duty of 
impartiality requires a fiduciary to act in the best interests of the beneficiaries, but 
recognizes that beneficiaries have competing economic interests242 and, therefore, 
it allows a fiduciary to exercise discretion while having a duty to act bona fide in 
the best interests of the beneficiaries as a whole.243 
Due to the duty’s recognition that beneficiaries may have competing 
economic interests, it provides a few guidelines to the fiduciary that can be 
applied by her or him in its decision-making process: 
First, impartiality does not mean that a fiduciary must treat each 
beneficiary equally. The fiduciary may give priority to the interests of certain 
beneficiaries or decide to give different weight to the interests of certain 
beneficiaries when balancing those interests, as long as the fiduciary 
treatment of the beneficiaries’ interests or conduct in administrating a trust 
(corporation) is not influenced by the fiduciary’s own personal agenda or 
favoritism toward individual beneficiaries.244 
Moreover, it is within the fiduciary duty to balance the beneficiaries’ 
competing interests in a reasonable way to “reflect any preferences and 
priorities that are discernible from the terms, purposes and circumstances of 
the trust and from the nature and terms of the beneficial interests.”245 In other 
words, the fiduciary must take into account any special terms, agreements 
and understandings that reflect the beneficiaries’ priorities, rights, and 
interests arising from the trust’s terms and circumstances. 
For example, applying the duty of impartiality on the classic common-
preferred stock conflict would require a board of directors to take into 
                                                          
 240. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 (AM. LAW INST. 2007). 
 241. See id. at cmt. b. 
 242. See id.; see also Susan N. Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term: Fiduciary Duties and ESG 
Integration, 90 U. OF COLO. L. REV. 731, 794 (2019). 
 243. See, e.g., Forbes Trustee Services Ltd v. Jackson [2004] EWHC 2448 (Ch) [36]; Edward C. 
Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American Trust Law at Century’s End, 88 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1877, 1913 (2000). 
 244. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 cmt. b. (AM. LAW INST. 2007); see also Forbes 
Trustee Services Ltd v. Jackson [2004] EWHC 2448 (Ch)[36]. 
 245. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 cmt. b. (AM. LAW INST. 2007). 
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account the preferred rights and interests as contracted under the 
corporation’s certificate of incorporation and give such rights and interests 
the applicable weight in its decision-making process. Depending on the 
specific set of circumstances surrounding a specific business decision and 
the specific contractual rights of the preferred, the board of directors would 
give different weight to the preferred rights. 
Under another example, a board of directors considering a sale of the 
corporation to a third party may give more weight to the rights of the 
preferred stockholders, with full participation liquidation preference, than it 
would give to preferred stockholders, with 3X non-participating liquidation 
preference, because presumably the interests of the preferred stockholders in 
the first case would be more aligned with those of the common stockholders. 
Thus, the board of directors is likely to better represent the interest of the 
stockholders as a whole. Of course, there are additional considerations to be 
considered in this case, such as whether the corporation was highly 
successful or facing financial difficulties. Each fact should be given a certain 
weight in the board of directors’ decision-making process. 
Second, the duty of impartiality does not require an equal balance of 
diverse interests, but rather a balance of those interests in a manner that is 
consistent with the beneficial interests and the terms and purposes of the trust 
(corporation).246 The fiduciary should take into account the various needs, 
objectives, and tax positions that lead to different preferences of 
beneficiaries.247 This also includes taking into account different time horizons 
of different beneficiaries.248 As a practical matter, a board of directors should 
consider the interests of both short-term investors (e.g., activist investors) and 
long-term investors (e.g., founders, pension funds) when balancing these 
competing interests to reach a suboptimal business decision.249 
For example, if an activist stockholder proposes a business strategy that 
is likely to produce short-term returns (but the likelihood for long-term returns 
is low) and the founder (also the CEO and corporation’s stockholder) proposes 
a long-term strategy that will likely to result in a long-term return, a board of 
directors would be required to consider each of these investment strategies in 
an impartial way. That means that the board of directors may give significant 
weight to the founder’s proposal if it believes that such proposal would reflect 
                                                          
 246. See id. at cmt. c. 
 247. See id. 
 248. See Gary, supra note 242, at 794-96. 
 249. See James Hawley, Keith Johnson & Ed Waitze, Reclaiming Fiduciary Duty Balance, 4(2) 
ROTMAN INT’L J. OF PENSION MGMT. 4, 8 (2011); see also the decision of the United States Supreme 
Court in Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 514 (1996) (“The common law of trusts recognizes the 
need to preserve assets to satisfy future, as well as present, claims and requires a trustee to take impartial 
account of the interests of all beneficiaries.”). 
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the best interests of the corporation’s stockholders as a whole. On the other 
hand, the board of directors may also adopt the activist’s proposal if it believes 
that the founder’s proposal is too optimistic250 or driven by her or his own 
personal agenda251 or that the activist proposal is likely to result in a higher 
return (even if the likelihood for long-term return is low). Of course, for such 
suboptimal outcome to be practically feasible, the board of directors would 
need to communicate with the stockholders in order to fully understand the 
effects of each of these investment strategies. 
Third, whenever necessary, the fiduciary duty of impartiality requires a 
fiduciary to obtain information from the beneficiaries concerning their 
financial needs, circumstances and preferences.252 The fiduciary typically 
does need not to consult with all existing beneficiaries, but should select 
beneficiaries who would reasonably be expected to reflect the diverse 
beneficial interests that are likely to be affected.253 The fiduciary should 
avoid arbitrary discrimination among persons similarly situated with respect 
to the matter involved.254 Additionally, in matters that can be expected to 
affect the trust beneficiaries generally, such as a change of business, the 
fiduciary might need to consult with all types of beneficiaries.255 
As a practical matter, such communication is done through 
stockholders’ resolutions, allowing stockholders to express their preferences 
for certain corporate actions.256 Although this process has been shown to 
successfully influence corporate actions,257 it is important to note that under 
both the Restatement (Third) of Trusts 258 and Delaware case law,259 the 
board of directors may take discretionary corporate actions that it believes 
are in the best interests of the stockholders, even if it believes that the 
stockholders would disagree with such decisions.260 
                                                          
 250. See Barzuza & Talley, supra note 83, at 7 (“Optimism bias—the proclivity of corporate 
managers to overestimate the success probability of their own projects—has already been documented 
extensively in the economics and finance literature.”). 
 251. See discussion regarding the Facebook case supra page 31, Part II.B.ii. 
 252. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 cmt. d. (AM. LAW INST. 2007). 
253.  See id. 
 254. See id. 
 255. See id. 
 256. See Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, 43 J. CORP. L. 217, 218-19 (2018).  
 257. Id. 
 258. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 80 cmt. b. (AM. LAW INST. 2007) (referring to § 79 
cmt. D which stated that “[a]fter obtaining advice or consultation, the trustee can properly take the 
information or suggestions into account but then, unlike delegation, must exercise independent, prudent, 
and impartial fiduciary judgment on the matters involved”). 
 259. See, e.g., the decision of then-Vice Chancellor Strine in In re Lear Corp. Shareholder Litigation, 
967 A.2d 640, 655 (Del. Ch. 2008) (“[D]irectors may take good faith actions that they believe will benefit 
stockholders, even if they realize that the stockholders do not agree with them.”). 
 260. See id. For an interesting discussion on whether directors should act in what they think are the 
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In conclusion, the fiduciary duty of impartiality provides an analytic 
framework for the consistent resolution of stockholders’ conflicts of interest. 
It is a balancing test that provides a corporation’s board of directors a flexible 
tool with which to weigh various, and often conflicting, interests of 
stockholders to reach a resolution that maximizes the value of the enterprise 
as a whole. This framework is a proposed way of resolving stockholders’ 
conflicts of interest and, because it is mostly derived from the U.S. common 
law of trusts, it should be further shaped and developed by courts to be 
adequately applied in an intra-corporate context. 
 
C. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The proposed framework outlined above is with respect to the standard of 
conduct, i.e., the considerations a board of directors should consider when 
considering taking a corporate action.261 In the context of common-preferred 
conflict,262 and in the context of interclass preference conflicts,263 this Article 
argues that the board of directors should consider both the interests of the common 
stockholders and the preferred stockholders, and balance their competing interests 
through the fiduciary duty of impartiality to reach a decision that would reflect the 
best interests of the corporation’s stockholders as a whole.264 
One may wonder how a director who, for example, was appointed by a 
venture capital firm could be impartial? Indeed, such a director may be 
conflicted if the interests of the preferred stockholders diverge from those of 
the common stockholders.265 Such a situation is not a given one266 and, 
therefore, is generally considered on a case-by-case basis.267 In case the 
majority of directors are found to be conflicted, the decision of the board of 
directors would generally not enjoy deference under the business judgment 
rule, and the Delaware court would review the directors’ decision under the 
                                                          
best interests of stockholders, or what stockholders think are in the best interests of stockholders, see 
Hirst, supra note 256, at 232-34. 
 261. See supra page 34, Part III. 
 262. See supra page 5, Part I. 
 263. See supra page 24, Part II. 
 264. See supra page 37, Part III.B. 
 265. See In re Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 73 A.3d 17, 52 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 266. See Boschner & Simmerman, supra note 84, at 7. On that note, there is an emerging 
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strict “entire fairness” standard of review.268 
Recall that the fiduciary duty of impartiality is an extension of the duty 
of loyalty.269 As such, a director who would be found conflicted by the 
Delaware court could not be considered impartial. Alternatively, a director 
not found to be conflicted by the Delaware court should enjoy the deference 
under the business judgment rule, including the presumption that her or his 
decisions were made in an impartial way, because there would presumably 
be no concern that the director would favor per se the preferred stockholders’ 
interests over those of the common stockholders.270 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Horizontal conflicts of interest have been increasing in the past few 
years, both in privately held and publicly traded corporations. As a result, 
they have raised profound questions about whether fiduciary duties should 
rescale themselves.271 
This Article analyzed stockholders’ conflicts of interest on two levels. 
First, this Article analyzed the common-preferred conflict in light of Trados 
and ODN and pointed out the problematic issues that arose vis-à-vis the 
Delaware Chancery Court’s decisions.272 The conclusion of this analysis was 
that the enforcement of preferred stockholders’ rights should be undertaken 
through the board of directors’ fiduciary duties to all stockholders, without 
prejudice. Second, this Article analyzed the potential interclass preference 
conflict between and among different types of preferred and common 
stockholders and argued that the current approach the court takes lacks a 
solution both for privately held and publicly traded corporations.273 
The Article concluded with a proposed framework for resolving these 
conflicts of interest. The Article proposed the fiduciary duty of impartiality 
as an analytic framework to resolve conflicts of interest between and among 
holders of common stock and multiple classes of preferred shares.274 
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